Нападение Германии на СССР в учебниках истории разных стран


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BigCap

25.06.2017 - 07:26

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Цитата (DAndr0474 @ 25.06.2017 - 01:02)

Цитата (BigCap @ 24.06.2017 - 21:17)

"Гитлер вывел свои войска из СССР в 1942 году" - сильно!

А вы уверены что перевод верен? 42 год-переломный.Немцы повернули назад.

ага.... не знал что в 1942 году немцы свои войска уже вывели. Битву про Сталинград видимо сняли на киностудии отечественные пропагандисты.

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Hedgehog24	25.06.2017 - 07:45 [ показать ] 0
Статус: Offline Ярила Регистрация: 3.06.12 Сообщений: 13695	Я даже читать не стал. После всемирной истерии русофобии вполне можно предположить, что СССР напал на бедного Адольфа. Его ССманы неся огромные потери пытались остановить орды Сталина. В конечном итоге союзники спасли их от полного уничтожения эвакуировав на свою территорию вместе с учеными и их наработками. Это сообщение отредактировал Hedgehog24 - 25.06.2017 - 07:46
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konorus

25.06.2017 - 08:44

-2

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Юморист

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Цитата (BigCap @ 24.06.2017 - 21:57)

Цитата (Костер @ 24.06.2017 - 21:49)

Цитата (BigCap @ 24.06.2017 - 21:41)

Цитата (Костер @ 24.06.2017 - 21:38)

Цитата (Drts @ 24.06.2017 - 21:29)

Французы не зря коротко пишут,
если углубиться, надо будет объяснять, сколько французов в составе немецкой армии напали на СССР,
и вдруг кто-нить на фотках узнает своих прадедов,
да и нельзя их школьникам рассказывать что франция слилась за месяц

Дивизия Шарлемань просто капля по сравнению с советскими коллабарационистами воевавшими на стороне вермахта и армией Власова

а что вы скажете про французскую промышленность и сельское хозяйство которое работало на германию всю войну?

А что вы скажете про жителей Пскова, которые находились под оккупацией 3 года, на кого они работали и как выживали?

к началу войны с СССР во французской “оборонке”, работавшей на вермахт, было занято 1,6 млн человек. По неполным немецким данным, до января 1944 года они поставили Германии около 4000 самолетов, около 10 тыс. авиационных двигателей, 52 тыс. грузовиков. Вся локомотивная промышленность и 95 процентов станкостроительной работали только на Германию...при чем здесь жители Пскова?

Жители Пскова тоже работали! Также как и остальные жители СССР, находящиеся на оккупированных фашистами территориях. Не забывайте про партизанское движение.

Минусят полицаи, сотрудничавшие с фашистами? Партизаны- это не только Ковпак и освобождённые от фашистов территории Белоруссии. Партизаны в большей или меньшей степени были во всех оккупированных фашистами областях СССР. Жители сёл и городов помогали как могли!

Отправлено с мобильного клиента YAPik+

Это сообщение отредактировал konorus - 25.06.2017 - 09:22

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edelveys0404

25.06.2017 - 12:26

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Цитата (Диагноз @ 25.06.2017 - 07:03)

Цитата

Англия? Надо было сразу просить помощь СССР, хотя где гарантия,что они хотят реальной помощи? Идеологический противник СССР,союзник?

Просить помощи у государства которое делит Европу вместе с Гитлером? Черчилль выступил вечером 22 июня без просьб, и сказал что не вступит в переговоры с Гитлером, и поможет СССР,пока не будет победы, а Сталин ещё неделю выжидал, ожидая восстания пролетариата в Германии

Ничего СССР не делил. 22 июня Черчилль хоть что мог сказать, раньше надо было действовать в сторону укрепления коалиции против Гитлера. А то все двигали Гитлера на восток. Наверно,вздохнул с облегчением.
В современном мире хохляндию будоражат и заигрывают с таким же способом. Хохлы как паны 1939 смотрят на запад, типо еуропейцы, на самом деле это разменная монета для нападок на Россию.
Англия имперские замашки с колониальной политикой прямо забудет? Разделяли всегда и властвовали. И сейчас хотят.
Сталин вряд ли на восстание рассчитывал, это уже дас ист фантастиш. Ну не был Сталин дураком. Просто не думал,что Гитлер на два фронта пойдет. Но учитывая войнушку с Англией за фронт Гитлер напал. А может война с Англией показушная? Чего мирные города не обстреливать и бомбить? Ни один через Ла-Манш не пошел же?

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нуакакже

25.06.2017 - 13:45

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Цитата (Диагноз @ 25.06.2017 - 07:03)

Цитата

Хе-хе.
Да Вы юморист, батенька.
Договариваться с теми кто вместе с Гитлером и Муссолини делит Европу?
Про Мюнхен забыли?

Когда Чемберлен сотрясал - "я привез вам мир"?

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нуакакже

25.06.2017 - 13:57

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Или вот это (первые два выступления) из cab-24-284 № F.P. 36

Цитата

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS suggested that, pending the arrival at the Meeting of certain telegrams which had been drafted, the Committee should be informed of certain Conclusions which had been provisionally reached on,the previous day.
THE PRIME MINISTER reminded the Committee that at the Meeting of the Cabinet on the 20th March (Cabinet 13(39) Conclusion 1), it had been decided to proceed on the basis of the proposed Four Power declaration of consultation. While the French had accepted our proposal, and the Russians, though with some hesitation, had also accepted it, subject to its being accepted by France and Poland, Poland was unwilling to join, partly because she wished to maintain her traditional policy of keeping a balance between Germany and Russia, and was consequently reluctant to join in any public declaration directed against Germany, and in particular because she feared that by joining with Soviet Russia in such a declaration Germany would regard her as having passed definitely into the enemy camp, and this might well precipitate an attack on Poland by Germany. Moreover, regard must also be had to Poland's inborn dislike and distrust of Soviet Russia.
Poland had suggested that there should be a confidential bilateral understanding between Great Britain and Poland by which the two countries would be bound by the declaration, as though they had signed it, but the fact of the conclusion of this understanding would he concealed; not only from the public, but also from the French Government. Poland feared that a disclosure to France would mean that the information would leak out, with highly deterimental consequences to herself.
In the face of the attitude of Poland, it seemed that on this basis the best we could hope for would be
(l) a public declaration by Great Britain, France and Russia on the lines of our draft.
(2) A secret bilateral understanding to the same effect between Great Britain and Poland and
(3) into this framework to fit the existing Franco-Polish obligations of consultation and assistance as provided for in the Franco-Polish Treaty.
Even if we could agree to a scheme on these lines it was becoming clearer that our attempts to build up a front against German aggression were likely to be frustrated if Russia was closely associated with the scheme. We had recently received communications both from Poland and Roumania that any public association of Russia with the scheme would greatly diminish and weaken the authority of the common front. Similar intimations had been received from Finland, Yugoslavia, Italy, Spain and Portugal, and we had been warned that the inclusion of Russia would
(1) Impede the construction of the front against aggression, since a number of our potential associates were extremely reluctant to be associated with Russia even for the purpose of resisting Germany.
(2) Tend to consolidate the relations between the parties to the anti-Comintern Pact and make it less likely that we would he able to exercise influence on and establish good relations with the weaker members of the Pact, namely, Italy and Japan.
(3) Excite anxiety in such countries as Spain, Portugal and certain South American Republics.
It looked, therefore, as if a failure to associate with Soviet Russia would give rise to suspicion and difficulty with the Left Wing both in this country and in France, while on the other hand insistence to associate with Soviet Russia would destroy any chance of building up a solid and united front against German aggression.
In these circumstances it seemed that some alternative course must be found and that we must abandon the policy of the Four Power Declaration and concentrate on the country which, on the whole seemed likely to be the next victim of German aggression, namely, Roumania.
Roumania was for the time being in a special position. She had considerable resources in oil and agricultural products greatly needed by Germany, and from this point of view she presented a great temptation to Germany, as her effective occupation and control by that country would go far to neutralise what perhaps Germany most feared, an effective naval blockade.
Moreover, if Germany got possession or effective control of Roumania, she would be in a much stronger position than she is at present successfully to attack and overrun Poland. Poland herself would be wellnigh encircled and the moral effect on smaller States, like Greece and Bulgaria, in South-Eastern Europe, would be far reaching. Already there were signs that the ease with which Germany was gaining her objectives had begun to undermine the morale of those States and diminish their confidence in the power of the Western Democracies to assist them.
It would seem, therefore, that Roumania was the country most likely to be attacked by Germany and which would give her at the moment the greatest political and economic advantages. If Roumania was effectively controlled by Germany, Poland would be in grave danger. In her own interests, therefore, Poland might be prepared to come into an agreement under which she would come to the assistance of Roumania if Roumania's independence was threatened provided that France and Great Britain also agreed to go to Roumania's aid.
The inclusion of Poland in the scheme was vital because Germany's weak point was her inability at present to conduct war on two fronts, and unless Poland was with us Germany would be able to avoid this contingency.
Our first step should therefore be to approach Poland and Roumania and ascertain whether (a) if Poland or Roumania are attacked directly or indirectly by Germany (e.g. in the case of Roumania with the connivance of Hungary) they are prepared to resist. (b) If so, Great Britain and France would be prepared to support them. It would be understood that as a counterpart for our undertaking to support Poland and Roumania, Poland and Roumania should keep Great Britain and France fully informed of any developments threatening their independence. (c ) We should also ascertain whether Poland was prepared to join in resistance in support of Roumania if the latter was attacked by Germany and vice versa. (d) Since Poland, unlike Roumania, has a Treaty of Mutual Assistance with France and is a stronger military Power than Roumania, the undertaking under (b) above would be given as part of a reciprocal arrangement by which if France and Great Britain were attacked or if they go to war with Germany to resist German aggression anywhere in Western Europe or in Yugo-Slavia, the Polish Government would support them. It should be noted that this provision would apply to Poland and not to Roumania.
It would be observed that this plan left Soviet Russia out of the picture. In view of the effect of her inclusion on other States it would seem imprudent to attempt to bring Russia into the plan publicly. We should have to explain to her that the objections to her open inclusion come not from ourselves but from other quarters, and we should suggest that there should be a secret agreement between Russia and Great Britain under which Russia would come to the help of Poland or Roumania in case either of these countries become involved in war with Germany. The Franco-Soviet Pact might possibly offer the means toy which Russia might he indirectly and secretly brought into the scheme.
It would be observed that the plan outlined above dealt only with the Eastern Front. Doubts had been expressed whether in point of fact Poland would be prepared to enter into the reciprocal arrangements mentioned in (b) above, i..e. that if France or Great Britain were attacked, the Polish Government would come to their support. If Poland declined to entertain a commitment of this kind then nevertheless we should he prepared to give her the unilateral assurance as regards the Eastern Front seeing that our object was to check and defeat Germany's attempt at world domination.
The Prime Minister added that he had not so far dealt with the position of Yugo-Slavia. The idea was that Yugo-Slavia should be mentioned to Poland as another country to which assistance should toe given in the event of an attack by Germany threatening her independence. If Poland showed reluctance to enter into commitments vis à vis Yugo-Slavia we should not unduly press her because on the whole a German attack on Yugo-Slavia seemed unlikely, since such an attack would be likely to bring Germany into conflict with Italy. In this connection the passage in Signor Mussolini's speech on March 26th., in which he referred to Italy's paramount interests in the Adriatic was no doubt intended for German consumption.
In conclusion, the Prime Minister emphasised the necessity for urgent and immediate action. He had not thought it expedient to summon an emergency meeting of the Cabinet to consider the new proposals, as this might have caused undue publicity.If the Foreign Policy Committee approved the course now proposed, the draft telegrams which the Meeting was to consider could he despatched that evening, in the form adopted by the Committee.

Это сообщение отредактировал нуакакже - 25.06.2017 - 14:02

Нападение Германии на СССР в учебниках истории разных стран

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ФРУНЗИКДЖАН

25.06.2017 - 16:55

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Цитата (Костер @ 24.06.2017 - 22:24)

так кто в этом виноват, что темпы наступления немцев были больше чем во Франции? Сталин? Почему ни кто не мог организовать оборону вплоть до Москвы? Почему немецкий пролетариат не взбунтовался против фашисткого режима? Почему население Советской прибалтики считало фашистов освободителями, когда колхозники могли работать не за деньги а за трудодни?

Параллельно стремлениям стабилизировать фронт и остоновить противника , проводилась не менее масштабная операция по эвакуации промышленных предприятий. ИМХО , на первых этапах войны, именно эвакуация была в приоритете. В том числе и по этой причине фронт стабилизировался только под Москвой.

Прибалты и сейчас вообщем-то довольны натовской оккупацией. Ментально не наш народ

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